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Edizioa / Edición

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Ana Canales
Agurtzane Quincoces
Ekoizpen exekutiboa / Producción ejecutiva

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Diseinua / Diseño

Eriz Moreno Aranguren
Argazkiak / Fotografía

Iñigo Cabo
Eriz Moreno Aranguren
Aitor Arakistain
Maketazioa / Maquetación

Iñigo Cabo
Steffen Poser
Entrevista a Frank Samson
por Benjamin Leclercq
Testuak / Textos

Hori-hori
Claro Tłumaczenia
Itzulpenak / Traducciones

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[Cuts.]

[...] esta forma artificial representa en sí misma la discontinuidad del Sentido, la lógica de un Sentido que siendo discontinuo ya en sí —pues se articula mediante sus cortes inherentes no-sentido y la composición referencial a aquello ausente a lo que aluden [o eluden] a través de sus discontinuidades configurativas—, queda limitado en la letra —en el signo— como salto, es decir, en la figura que representa su corte:

Si la letra no puede reducir la ausencia es porque ésta es el éter y la respiración de aquélla. La letra es separación y límite en que el sentido se libera, de quedar encerrado en la soledad aforística. Pues toda escritura es aforística. Ninguna «lógica», ningún crecimiento de lianas conjuntivas puede acabar con su discontinuidad y su inactualidad esenciales, con la genialidad de sus silencios *sobreentendidos*. [...] La racionalidad del Logos de la que es responsable nuestra escritura obedece al principio de discontinuidad. No es sólo que la cesura acabe y fije el sentido: «El aforismo, la sentencia —dice Nietzsche— en lo que me he hecho maestro entre los alemanes, son formas de la eternidad». Pero en primer lugar la cesura hace surgir el sentido. No por sí sola, claro está; pero sin la interrupción —entre las letras, las palabras, las frases, los libros— no podría despertarse ninguna significación. *Suponiendo* que la Naturaleza rechace el *salto*, se comprende por qué la Escritura no será nunca la Naturaleza. Sólo actúa por saltos.¹

Así, pues, no habrá una teoría de los signos diferente a un análisis del sentido. Sin embargo, el sistema otorga cierto privilegio a la primera por encima de la segunda; puesto que no da a lo que se significa una naturaleza diferente de la que le otorga el signo, el sentido no podrá ser más que la totalidad de los signos desplegada en su encadenamiento; se dará en el cuadro completo de los signos. Pero, por otra parte, la red completa de signos se liga y se articula según los cortes propios del sentido.²

La evidencia en imagen-signo que [] posiciona de modo característico en el formato-objeto del lenguaje, —el libro—, sitúa ante el lector tanto la discontinuidad configurativa del objeto estético —y de sus actos lingüísticos, sean estos gramaticales o visuales—, como la discontinuidad general de la Naturaleza y su transcurso, un ritmo ante el que precisamente se dispone la discontinuidad entre el Logos y la ausencia, el espacio de negatividad [estética] del Sentido, copresentándolo a la discontinuidad natural que los signos solamente refieren. Lo que en este catálogo se convoca es la necesidad de un corte en la experiencia lectiva, un corte en el signo visual que actúe como denotación al lector de que aquello que se encuentra extendido a través de la representación infinita sólo obtiene su Sentido real en el propio corte que el espectador realice sobre su mirada. La imagen llama desde su evidencia a la [imagen] real, la afirmación del acto de representación como forma no trata de contradecir su

discontinuidad configurativa, sino concretamente activarlo como signo, como realidad artificial cuya experiencia es cultural, pero cuya presencia y Sentido únicamente son factibles si se activa a su vez otra copresencia —a la que ni siquiera el Sentido tras sus cortes inherentes del no-sentido llega, pero declama—, la copresencia indecible de lo natural y el Sinsentido.

Esta presentación explícita al lector la discontinuidad evidente de las imágenes (se presenta a la Representación a través de su representación...), pone en sus manos la discontinuidad principal que aquí nos atañe. ¿Cómo actúa el artista, más allá de confirmar las discontinuidades configurativas del signo, a la hora de manifestar la discontinuidad de su acto artístico respecto a la discontinuidad de lo Real?, ¿Cómo realiza su objeto para que actúe no en discontinuidad configurativa, en representación de aquello que de otros modos ya representaba, sino siendo discontinuidad real? El objeto, de alguna forma, no sólo ha de evidenciar su salto [simbólico], sino procurarse en el salto natural de lo Real. La discontinuidad principal es por tanto la que consigna el corte en el mismo acto artístico de configuración discontinua, la discontinuidad artística que produce *in-voluntariamente* un intervalo en la producción del Sentido para despejar las discontinuidades configurativas de la Representación, sobre todo en cuanto a la traslación [movimiento] y transferencia de esa representación, donde las discontinuidades configurativas se pronuncian exponencialmente y reierten en lenguaje duplicado [paralaje] aquello que antes observaban directamente. El corte de la discontinuidad artística es precisamente relevante allí donde los formatos generan y transmiten una multiplicidad reflexiva que ahonda en la infinitud negativa del Sentido, y que lo constriñen en signo *diferencial*.

[Extract, Págs. 693-694]

- 1- **Nivel simbólico:** lectura visual de imágenes e interpretación subjetivo-imaginaria del texto (negatividad estética). Ausencia. Discontinuidad configurativa.
- 2- **Nivel perceptivo:** Percepción cognitiva sonora-visual, contacto manual, captación sensible. Tacto.
- 3- **Nivel objeto-forma supralingüístico:** Fisicidad fónica del texto, materialidad gráfica, materialidad icónica. Presencia.

[Extract, Pág. 699]

Los tres diferentes niveles, que van desde la interpretación lectiva y aprehensiva, al tacto y contacto físico, sensible y perceptivo, hasta llegar a la situación de copresencia entre la realidad suprasubjetiva y presubjetiva (fuerzas), la evidencia de la representación como realidad (formal, material y prelingüística), y la imbricación interactiva con los fenómenos de la física natural, posicionan en el intervalo de la copresencia al orden subjetivo con los sistemas, medios y cuerpos de lo objetivo, la copresencia de lo óntico y lo ontológico. Lo Sinsentido y el Sentido se

1: Jacques Derrida, *La escritura y la diferencia* (Barcelona: Editorial Anthropos, 1989), 98.

2: Michelle Foucault, *Las palabras y las cosas: una arqueología de las ciencias humanas* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno editores, 2010), 72.

manifiestan cuales presencias conjuntas en lo Real, un vehículo de la representación sin primacías, tanto una neutralización (de las discontinuidades configurativas y su recepción, o de las jerarquías entre discurso y narración, entre documento y ficción, entre signos, información y símbolos), como diferentes intensidades entre objetos, dispositivos, medios, formas y la efusión de lo personal, experiencial, vital, privado, colectivo, social y público.

[Extract, Pág. 713]

[...] Ciertamente, el arte puede muy bien ser ese espacio donde una imagen no representa ni una cosa —pura— ni un poder que a causa de esa limitación de la representación se legitimado a abastirse sobre los individuos. Hay un *impoder* en el arte que puede, paradójicamente ser una vía modélica de emancipación, un *impoder* que se contrapone al poder existente, que vive de una representacionalidad *separada*.³

[...] the fictionalization of artistic authority or what, adapting Foucault, we may call “the artist-function”, and the fictionalization of the documentary form, in particular, the archive. Such fictionalization corresponds to and renders visible the fictitiousness of the contemporary itself.⁴

3: Carlos Vidal, *Crítica de la representaciones, para una redefinición del concepto de representación*. En tiempo Real. El arte mientras tiene lugar (La Coruña: Fundación Luis Seoane, 2001), 78.

4: Peter Osborne, en su ensayo sobre el postconceptualismo, analiza el aspecto ficcional del trabajo de **The Atlas Group** del siguiente modo: **The fictionalization of artistic authority (anonymity and the author-function)**. The fictionalization of artistic authority or what, adapting Foucault, we may call “the artist-function”, and the fictionalization of the documentary form, in particular, the archive. Such fictionalization corresponds to and renders visible the fictitiousness of the contemporary itself. It also renders explicit a certain general fictitiousness of the post-conceptual artwork, which is an effect of the counter-factuality inherent in its conceptual dimension, and imparts to it a structurally “literary” aspect. Each materialization can be understood as the performance of a fictive element or idea. In this respect, the generic post-medium concept of art reincorporates “literature”, returning it to its philosophical origins in early German romanticism. *Post-conceptual art articulates a post-aesthetic poetics*. Historically, the fictionalization of the artist-function is, of course, not an uncommon authorial strategy. It represents an extension of both the strategy of pseudonymity (prevalent under conditions of censorship and the need for social dissimulation of various kinds) and the “impersonality” of an Eliottian modernism. Theoretically, it is best conceived, I think, in terms of Foucault’s analysis of the author-function, which was itself in many ways (like much of post-structuralism) a theorization of the implications of the practice of the modernist avant-gardes. For Foucault, the replacement of the concept of the author by that of the authorfunction was “a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse ...[by] grasp[ing] the subject’s points of insertion, modes of functioning, and system of dependencies”. This is dependent upon, first, its creative use of anonymity, within pseudonymity, via the Group form (pseudonymity, one might say, is a condition of *historical* fictionalization); and second, the exploitation of the documentary, simultaneously, as indexical mark and pure cultural form. More deeply, it relies for its productive ambiguity upon a general ambiguity in the relationship between fictional and historical narratives themselves – an ambiguity that finds its point of indifference in the concept of *speculation*, through which it achieves both its philosophical and political force [...]

Fiction Nonetheless, the idea of the contemporary functions as if there is. That is, it functions as if the speculative horizon of the unity of human history had been reached. In this respect, the contemporary is a utopian idea, with both negative and positive aspects. Negatively, it involves a disavowal; positively, it is an act of the productive imagination. It involves a disavowal –a disavowal of its own future, speculative basis– to the extent to which it projects an actual conjunction of times. This is a disavowal of the futurity of the present by its very presentness; essentially, it is a disavowal of politics. It is a productive act of imagination to the extent to which it performatively projects a non-existent unity onto the disjunctive relations between coeval times. In this respect, in rendering present the absent time of a unity of times, *all constructions of the contemporary are fictional*.

Peter Osborne, “Contemporary art is post-conceptual art”, en conferencia impartida en la Fondazione Antonio Ratti. (Como: Villa Sucota, 2010), 13-14. Publicada en el libro: Peter Osborne, *Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art* (Londres y Nueva York: Verso, 2013).

Esta narrativa de la secuencialidad fotográfica con protagonistas nos lleva a la reflexividad de la tragedia clásica⁵, en la que los actores reflexionan en voz “objetiva” el desenlace y hablan directamente con el público, rompiendo la continuidad del relato característico de la comedia y la discontinuidad de la escena representada con el plano Real, amplificando el juego de la ficción y el de la propia discontinuidad entre narrativa, subjetividad, representación y realidad, manejando la flexión entre la supuesta continuidad del discurso en un sentido real (con el público observador) y la tensión de este real como parte discontinua del drama, desvelando aquello oculto en la representación para acentuar la evidencia de la discontinuidad [configurativa] al Sentido (*in*)completo.⁶

[Extract, Págs. 421-422]

5: En ambas dimensiones, la de la unidad y la de los elementos, la experiencia estética de la tragedia conduce de vuelta detrás de la objetividad del producto bello. La tragedia realiza un trabajo de rememoración estética, y descubre lo que subyace en forma oculta a esta objetividad. Esto caracteriza a la experiencia estética de la tragedia como una experiencia reflexiva –como una experiencia de la reflexividad de la tragedia–. En esta experiencia estético-reflexiva se enlazan –también en ambas dimensiones, es decir en la de la unidad y en la de los elementos– la experiencia del carácter performativo (de la producción) con la experiencia de la diferencia (de la diversidad y diferencialidad). De esta manera, la experiencia de la unidad de la tragedia como unidad “hecha” es, al mismo tiempo, la experiencia de que esta unidad esta hecha de una diversidad de voces detrás de la cual no es posible retroceder.

[...] si seguimos empleando una terminología kierkegaardiana, entonces podremos decir que la tragedia es un fenómeno ético por la experiencia de lo trágico y un fenómeno estético por la del juego. Aquí “lo trágico” designa la irresolubilidad éticamente experimentada de los conflictos, y “juego” (Derrida), la realización estética de un libre proyectar y disolver de nuevo el sentido.

Christoph Menke, *Estética y Negatividad* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2001), 197.

6: En cuanto a la incompletitud [gödeliana] del Sentido que escenifica y representa el drama y su relación con la dialéctica negativa de Adorno y la discontinuidad configurativa, Althusser introduce el término de –*distanciamiento*– (en su análisis crítico de la obra de Bertolt Brecht), revisando la dialéctica entre la conciencia dramática / ideológica y la realidad, y desactivando la perspectiva fenomenológica hegeliana desde la concepción marxista del teatro materialista, que expresa ese distanciamiento del espectador a una situación dramática no explícitamente representada, como aquello otro a la conciencia que la diferencia, no desde su expresión subjetiva en la interpretación de los actores característica de la tragedia, sino en su ausencia de esa voz o figura interpretativa, en el velado del Sentido [y en el desvelamiento de la ficción] (N. del A.):

“No se trata de fabricar una nueva filosofía o un nuevo teatro. Se trata de instaurar una nueva práctica en el interior de la filosofía para que cese de ser una interpretación del mundo, es decir, mistificación, y ayude en la transformación del mundo; se trata de una nueva práctica en el interior del teatro para que cese de ser mistificación, es decir, divertimento culinario y ayude así en la transformación del mundo. El primer efecto de la nueva práctica debe, por tanto, sostenerse sobre la destrucción de la mistificación de la filosofía y el teatro. No suprimir la filosofía y el teatro, sino suprimir su mistificación. Así pues, es preciso llamar a las cosas por su nombre, llamar a la filosofía por su nombre, llamar al teatro por su nombre, volver a poner a la filosofía en su verdadero sitio, para hacer aparecer esta mistificación como mistificación, y, al mismo tiempo para mostrar la verdadera función de la filosofía y del teatro. Todo esto, naturalmente, debe hacerse en la filosofía y en el teatro. Para poner la filosofía y el teatro en su verdadero lugar, es preciso efectuar un *desplazamiento* (déplacement), o efecto de *desajuste* (décalage).

Aquí también las cosas ocurren parecidas en Brecht y Marx. Es en este sentido como se puede entender lo que Brecht llama *Verfremdungseffekt*, o sea, lo que se ha traducido al español por efecto de distanciación, que yo traduzco preferentemente por efecto de *desplazamiento*, o efecto de *desajuste*. Este efecto no debe ser comprendido solamente como un efecto de las técnicas teatrales, sino como un efecto general de la práctica teatral. No se trata de cambiar de lugar, de desplazar algunos pequeños elementos en la interpretación (“juego”) de los actores, se trata de desplazar lo que afecta al conjunto de las condiciones del teatro. La misma regla es válida para la filosofía. Se trata, pues, de un *conjunto de desplazamientos*, que constituyen esta nueva práctica. Entre todos estos desplazamientos, existe un desplazamiento fundamental, que es la causa de todos los otros y al mismo tiempo los resume: *el desplazamiento del punto de vista*. La gran lección de Marx y de Brecht es que se debe desplazar el punto de vista general a partir del cual todas las cuestiones de la filosofía y del teatro son consideradas. Se debe abandonar el punto de vista de la interpretación especulativa del mundo (filosofía) o el juicio de la estética culinaria (teatro) y desplazarse, para ocupar otro lugar que es, es sentido fuerte, este de la política.

[...] es preciso *desplazar el teatro en relación a la ideología del teatro* que existe en la cabeza de los espectadores. Para esto se debe “mostrar” que el teatro es teatro, solamente teatro, y no la vida. Se debe mostrar que la escena es una escena, levantada delante de los espectadores y no el prolongamiento de la sala. Se debe mostrar que hay entre la sala y la escena un vacío, una distancia. Se debe mostrar esta distancia *sobre la escena misma*”.

Louis Althusser, *Sobre Brecht y Marx* (México DF: Siglo XXI Editores, 1968), 5-6.


Paso 10. Discontinuidad artística. Intervalo en el Sentido y reactivación.

I have this conception of art, which is that art has to do with universality and infinity. It introduces something into the continuity of being, into the continuity of our survival. A break. Which is a universal break. [...] it breaks with the conditions of its own production.

[...] I don't think there's a rule. There is the capacity, well, the break-making capacity.

The way that we relate to ourselves is always conditioned by a break, there is a question of redoubling. Culture is always a question of redoubling: it redoubles the "normal" life. It reflects it into something else, but redoubling is always already there.⁷

Mladen Dolar



Stills de Eriz Moreno filmados en el proyecto –Artists Working: Discontinuity Barinatxe– IC 2013 – en curso.

- Un objeto representacional / documental (libro, disco, imagen, archivo) cuya experiencia receptiva sea individual [social] y [con]figurativa, ha de ir vinculado expresamente a otra experiencia –de presente– [Øpen present] distinta a la del objeto referido, que corte o intervale a aquél.

[Extract, Pág. 702]

Todos los aspectos técnicos, políticos, institucionales, sociológicos, informacionales..., son presentados como dispositivo sin la funcionalidad limitada del documento o la narrativa, sin el reflejo inmediato a un proyecto que no queda sostenido en la referencialidad. El trabajo (la investigación artística y su experiencia estética experimental) no tiene forma, sino PROFORMA, es una organización de la estrategia de hacer proyecto artístico, en la que se juxtaponen tiempos y modos..., (heterotópicos y heterocrónicos), intencionalidades, causalidades y casualidades (encuentros /contingencia). Siguiendo las palabras de Ibon Aranberri: «Al trasladarlo a información [–con toda su densidad–], y trabajarlo desde parámetros prelingüísticos, el Atlas se construye en la propia forma de organización»⁸. En contra de la idea convencional de libro o de publicación con principio y final se plantea una organización más abierta, un documento tridimensional que supusiera maquetar el espacio (como forma de superficie), no es un texto explícito sino una idea ontológica del arte, sobre su propio límite. La obra en la colección no se estatiza, no queda cerrada sino aquí mostrada como planteamiento abierto. Esta primera presentación dentro de la colección puede avanzar en otras formulaciones... en otras direcciones.

There is a relationship between the conceptual "degree zero" of the essay-about-its-own-status-as-an-art-object-as-an-art-object and the juggernaut of total artistic liberty. [...] For Dan Graham, as for the others, there was never any question of being a writer. What artist wrote was not literature, not even art criticism; somehow it was art, or at least it had an internal and maybe a historically new relation to art. Graham and his fellow conceptual artists understood that a text could be an art object only under certain very specific conditions, conditions he helped to define with early pieces like *Schema* (March 1966). The first condition was that the text refer exclusively to its own status as both text and as proposal for an art object.⁹

Art documentation thus signals the attempt to use artistic media within art spaces to make direct reference to life itself, in other words: to a form of pure activity or pure praxis, as it were; indeed, a reference to life in the art project, yet without wishing to directly represent it. Here, art is transformed into a way of life, whereby the work of art is turned into non-art, to mere documentation of this of life. Or, put in different terms, art is now becoming biopolitical because it has begun to produce and document life itself as pure activity by artistic means.¹⁰

[Extract, Págs. 740]

7: Mladen Dolar, entrevista realizada por Conny Habbel & Marlene Haderer en 2010, publicada en la página web "Wie geht Kunst?": <http://www.wiegehtkunst.com>

8: Ibon Aranberri, <http://www.macba.cat/es/rwm-fons-ibon-aranberri>

9: Jeff Wall, "Introduction", en *Partially Reflective Mirror Writing. /Two Way Mirror Power*, Dan Graham (Massachusetts: The MIT Press Cambridge, 1999), 10-13.

10: Boris Groys, "The Loneliness of the Project", en Issue II. Museum van Hedendaagse Kunst Antwerpen, Belgium (Nueva York: Magazine of Contemporary Art and Theory, 2009), 5.

El espectador forma parte del proyecto de investigación artística y entra en el mismo generando sus propios canales de desarrollo (la extensión activa y discontinua del proyecto documental y experimental de la investigación), pero tomando en cuenta su elemental y conectiva copresencialidad con todo aquello que articula lo Real, no sólo su construcción configurativa sino la experiencia de su existencia corpuscular [particular y universal].

De entre todos los casos y modelos artísticos que re-utilizan los signos documentales / trazando una trayectoria desde el concepto al post-concepto: desde la citación artística del postmodernismo y la serialización del símbolo y del significado, o la liberación del lenguaje como doble simbólico –Lawrence Weiner– y signo visual –Art & Language–, (u otros como Mel Bochner, Hanne Darboven, Marcel Broodthaers, Matt Mullican, Lothar Baumgarten, etc.), al uso del Logos como material signifiante (no-significado) que pasa de su transferencia semiótica y traducción semántica a su condición de artículo material de producción (previamente a su activación como fuente de *post*-producción –en este caso el *post* como “entrada” a la bitácora hipermedia y su producción inmaterial–), presentándose como *readysign*, signo específico minimalizado y nominalista cual *readymade*, que actúa como corte formal en la construcción gramatológica del historicismo, consignando los contenidos en una expresión directa, objetual, para servir como volúmenes proformales a una composición-articulación experiencial que rompa con la discontinuidad configurativa de un nuevo proyecto de historicidad, en el que la performatividad del objeto-documento dé salida a una serie de movimientos “*post-estructuralistas*” que no dispongan una arqueología retórica del pasado¹¹, sino su posibilidad prospectiva como indagación e investigación artístico-experimental en la construcción de otra señalética en que la formulación lingüística, trascendiendo su fenomenología de acontecimientos, instituciones o fenómenos simbólicos del significado, derive hacia una situación post-dispositiva donde se manifieste la discontinuidad óntico-ontológica del producto y su representación como un capítulo de un libro (proyecto) que se escribe activamente [y pasivamente] en la realidad. /

[Extract. Pág. 751]

11: Una primera distinción entre historicismo e historicidad se basa en que la primera adopta una mirada hacia el pasado de manera que los clichés y los estereotipos que tenemos del mismo simplemente convergen en una representación ficticia cuya forma principal es el pastiche, mientras que la segunda entiende la posibilidad de experimentar la historia de una manera activa que reorienta nuestro futuro colectivo. Peio Aguirre, *Archaeologies of the Future* (Bilbao: Sala Rekalde Erakustaretoa, 2007), 25.

Nota al margen:

Por el contrario, el corte real y no artificial en la representación –que planteamos en esta investigación con la discontinuidad artística– ha de suspender los dispositivos de la representación¹² [y los de la *non-representation*] –naturales (corporales y cognitivos), discursivos e interpretativos, técnicos y tecnológicos–. Corte completo (no solamente disrupción o inversión, ni puesta en crisis soberana) en los instrumentos y hechos antropológicos [lógicos e ilógicos –antropocéntricos–]; para que nuestra imagen reflejo de lo real pueda ser neutral (no potencialmente presubjetiva –ligada al deseo y proyectándolo–, sino imagen trascendental del hombre no deliberativa¹³ [ni desiderativa] y sin significado en su reflejo ante lo Sinsentido, en su realidad *ekstásica*¹⁴) pudiendo darse entonces la co-realidad de esa imagen cognitiva –en sí misma– (en su exterioridad inmediata al sujeto observador) con lo Real en sí, posibilitando de este modo, *posteriormente*, una co-agencia: del Sentido –desplegado a su aplazamiento infinito así como a su realidad de entidad inmaterial de producción simbólica– con el Sinsentido exterior –absoluto, indecible– al no estar este último ideado por el hombre ni manipulado por sus medios.

[Extract. Pág. 980]

Iñigo Cabo

* Cortes extraídos de: La DISCONTINUIDAD ARTÍSTICA Y EL SINSENTIDO. De la discontinuidad configurativa del objeto arte en la producción de Sentido, al corte y co-agencia del Sinsentido en el Proyecto Artístico. (IC)

12: A model of representation cannot be at once a representation of the world and what establishes the possibility of that representation. It cannot represent the world and represent that representation. [...] the brain constitutes the physical world without it being possible to explain either how the brain comes to be part of the world, or indeed even how the world could have originally produced the brain. Ray Brassier, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction* (Nueva York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 25.

13: Correspondiente a los procesos cognitivos individuales, “cuando los individuos realizan inferencias espontáneas, configurando procesos cognitivos automáticos, en los cuales no existe esfuerzo de deliberación”. Angel Gómez, Elena Gaviria e Itziar Fernández, *Psicología Social* (Madrid: Sanz y Torres, 2006), 32.

14: *Ecstasy* (or *ekstasis*; from the Ancient Greek ἔκστασις, “to be or stand outside oneself, a removal to elsewhere” from ek- “out,” and *stasis* “a stand, or a standoff of forces”) is a term used in Ancient Greek, Christian and Existential philosophy. The different traditions using the concept have radically different perspectives. The term is currently used in philosophy usually to mean “outside-of-itself”. One’s consciousness, for example, is not self-enclosed, one can be conscious of an Other person, who falls well outside of one’s own self. In a sense, consciousness is usually, “outside of itself,” in that its object (what it thinks about, or perceives) is not itself. This is in contrast to the term *enstasis* which means from “standing-within-onself” which relates to contemplation from the perspective of a speculator. J. Glenn Friesen, *Ecstasy and Religious Self-Reflection: A history of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas of pre-theoretical experience*. <http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Enstasy.pdf>

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IC – S/T– (2014 – irekia)

[Cuts.]

[...] forma artifizial honek Zentzuaren etena adierazten du bere baitan, berez jada etena den Zentzuaren logika –ez-zentzuko berezko etenen bidez artikulatzen baita eta bere eten konfiguratzaileen bidez ukitzen [edo saihesten] duen absentiaren konposizio erreferentzial bidez ere bai– letran –zeinuan– mugatuta geratzen da, hau da bere etena adierazten duen irudian mugatuta geratzen da:

Letrak absentsia urritu ezin badu, hau haren eterra eta arnasa delako da. Zentzua askatzen den banaketa eta muga da letra, bakardade aforistikoa itxita geratzetik askatzen duena. Idazkera oro aforistikoa baita. Inongo «logikak», inongo liana konjuntiboen hazkundeak azkendu dezake bere funtseko etena eta gaurkotatunetik eza, bere *esan gabe* doazen isiluneen bikaintasunarekin. [...] Gure idazkeraren ardurapeko Logosaren arrazionalitatea etenaren printzipioaren mendekoa da. Ez du soilik zezura amaitu eta zentzua finkatzen: «Aforismoaren, esakunearen—dio Nietzschek—maisu egin naiz Alemanian eta eternitatearen formak besterik ez dira». Baina, hasteko, zezurak zentzua sorrarazten du. Bere kabuz ez, jakina, baina etenik gabe —letren, hitzen, esaldien, liburuen arteko etenik gabe— ezingo litzateke inolako esanahirik erne. Naturak *jauzia arbuaitu* egiten duela kontuan izanda, Idazkera inoiz ere ez dela Natura izango ulertzen da. Jauzika baino ez dabil.¹

Beraz, zeinuen teoria zentzuaren azterketaren berdina izan behar da. Baina sistemak nolabaiteko pribilegioa ematen dio lehenengoari; izan ere, natura batek esan nahi duenari ez dio zeinuak ematen dionaren esanahi desberdina ematen, bere kateamenduan hedatutako zeinu guztiak izango dira zentzua; zeinu guztien koadro osoan emango da zentzua. Baina bestalde, zeinuen sare osoa lotu eta artikulatu egiten da zentzuaren berezko etenen arabera.²

Lengoiaren formatu-objektuan —liburuan— modu esanguratsuan kokatzen den irudi-zeinuaren ebidentziak [] irakurlearen aurrean kokatzen ditu nahiz objektu estetikoaren —eta bere ekintza linguistikoen, dela gramatikalen dela bisualen— eten konfiguratzailea nahiz Naturaren eta bere joanaren eten orokorra, eta erritmo horren aurrean kokatzen da Logosaren eta absentiaren arteko etena, Zentzuaren negatibitate [estetikoaren] espazioa, zeinuk soilik aipatzen duten eten naturalarekin batera aurkeztuaz. Katalogo honetan irakurketa esperientzian etena egoteko beharra dagoela esaten da, zeinu bisualean etena egin beharra dagoela irakurlea ohartu dadin adierazpen infinituaren bidez hedatuta dagoenak bere egiazko Zentzua ez duela ikusleak bere begiradan egingo duen etenean baino. Irudiak [irudi] errealarari egiten dio dei bere ebidentziaz, adierazpen ekitaldiaren baieztapena forma lege hartzek ez du bere eten konfiguratzailearen aurka egin nahi, baizik eta zeinu lege aktibatu nahi du, esperientzia kulturala duen

errealitate artifizial lege, baina bere presentzia eta Zentzua beste kopresentzia batekin batera aktibatu behar dira —Zentzuak bere ez-zentzuko berezko etenen bidez iristen ez den arren dei egiten duen batekin batera— naturalaren eta Zentzugabearen kopresentzia esanezinarekin.

Aurkezpen honek begien bistan jartzen dio irakurleari irudien bistako etena (Irudikapena bere irudikapenaren bidez aurkezten da...), esku artean dugun eten nagusia bere esku jartzen da. Zer egiten du artistak zeinuaren eten konfiguratiboak baiezatzear gain, bere ekintza artistikoaren etena Errealaren etenarekiko adieraztean? nola egiten du bere objektua eten konfiguratiboan aritu ordez, bestela ere irudikatzen zuen haren irudikapen izan dadin, egiazko etena izanaz ez bada? Objektua, nolabait ere, bere jauzi [sinbolikoa] nabarmentzeaz gain Errealaren jauzi naturalean lortzen saiatu behar da. Beraz, konfigurazio eteneko ekintza artistikoan bertan etena lortzen duena da eten nagusia, Zentzuaren ekoizpenean nahi-*gabe* tartea ekoizten duen eten artistikoa, Irudikapenaren eten konfiguratiboak argitzeko, batez ere irudikapen horren traslazioari [mugimenduari] eta transferentziari dagokionean, non eten konfiguratiboak esponenzialki adierazten diren eta lengoia bikoitzean [paralajea] itzultzen duten lehen zuzenean behatzen zutena. Eten artistikoaren ebakia bereziki garrantzitsua da formatuek aniztasun hausnarkorra sortzen eta igortzen duten hartan, Zentzuaren infinitotasun negatiboan sakontzen den eta zeinu *diferantzialera* mugatzen duten hartan.

[Lab., 693-694. or.]

- 1- ***Maila sinbolikoa***: irudien irakurketa bisuala eta testuaren interpretazio subjektibo-imaginarioa (negatibitate estetikoak). Absentsia. Eten konfiguratiboak.
- 2- ***Pertzepzio-maila***: pertzepzio kognitibo ikus-entzunezkoa, eskuzko harremana, zentzumenen bidez atzematea. Ukimena.
- 3- ***Objektu-forma supralinguistiko maila***: testuaren fisikotasun fonikoa, materialtasun grafikoa, materialtasun ikonikoa. Presentzia.

[Lab., 699. or.]

Hiru maila desberdin daude; hasi irakurketa eta atzipen bidezko interpretazio, ukimen eta harreman fisiko, sentsible eta hautemangarritik eta errealitate suprasubjektibo eta presubjektiboaren (indarren) arteko kopresentzia egoerara arte, irudikapena errealitate (formal, material eta prelinguistiko) bezala irudikatzen eta fisika naturaleko fenomenoekin teulatzen interaktibo izatera arte, horrek guztiak kopresentziaren tartean kokatzen du ordena subjektibo sistemekin, bitartekoekin eta objektiboaren gorputzekin, ontikoaren eta ontologikoaren kopresentzia. Ez-zentzua eta Zentzua baterako presentzia

1: Jacques Derrida, *La escritura y la diferencia* (Bartzelona: Editorial Anthropos, 1989), 98.

2: Michelle Foucault, *Las palabras y las cosas: una arqueología de las ciencias humanas* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno editores, 2010), 72.

bezala agertzen dira Errealean, irudikapenaren ibilgailua lehentasunik gabe, dela neutralizazioa (eten konfiguratioarena eta horren harrerarena, edo diskurtsoa eta narrazioaren, agiria eta fikzioaren, zeinuen, informazioaren eta sinboloen artekoa), objektuen, gailuen, bitartekoen eta formen arteko intentsitate desberdinak bezala eta pertsonalaren, esperientzialaren, bitalaren, pribatuaren, kolektiboaren, sozialaren eta publikoaren jario legez.

[Lab., 713. or.]

[...] Egia esan, artea izan daiteke espazio bat non irudi batek ez duen irudikatzen gauza -puru- bat ez botere bat zeinari irudikapenaren muga horren ondorioz banakoen gainera joateko baimena ematen zaion. Artean *ezboterea* dago eta paradokixoki hedapenerako bide eredugarria izan daiteke, dagoen botearen aurka jartzen den *ezboterea*, *banatutako* irudikagarritasunetik bizi dena.³

[...] the fictionalization of artistic authority or what, adapting Foucault, we may call “the artist-function”, and the fictionalization of the documentary form, in particular, the archive. Such fictionalization corresponds to and renders visible the fictitiousness of the contemporary itself.⁴

3: Carlos Vidal, *Crítica de la representaciones. Para una redefinición del concepto de representación. En tiempo Real. El arte mientras tiene lugar* (La Coruña: Fundación Luis Seoane, 2001), 78.

4: Peter Osborne, postkontzeptualismoari buruzko saioan, **The Atlas Groupen** lanaren alderdi fikzionala honela aztertu zuen: **The fictionalization of artistic authority (anonymity and the author-function).** The fictionalization of artistic authority or what, adapting Foucault, we may call “the artist-function”, and the fictionalization of the documentary form, in particular, the archive. Such fictionalization corresponds to and renders visible the fictitiousness of the contemporary itself. It also renders explicit a certain general fictitiousness of the post-conceptual artwork, which is an effect of the counter-factuality inherent in its conceptual dimension, and imparts to it a structurally “literary” aspect. Each materialization can be understood as the performance of a fictive element or idea. In this respect, the generic post-medium concept of art reincorporates “literature”, returning it to its philosophical origins in early German romanticism. *Post-conceptual art articulates a post-aesthetic poetics.* Historically, the fictionalization of the artist-function is, of course, not an uncommon authorial strategy. It represents an extension of both the strategy of pseudonymity (prevalent under conditions of censorship and the need for social dissimulation of various kinds) and the “impersonality” of an Eliottian modernism. Theoretically, it is best conceived, I think, in terms of Foucault’s analysis of the author-function, which was itself in many ways (like much of post-structuralism) a theorization of the implications of the practice of the modernist avant-gardes. For Foucault, the replacement of the concept of the author by that of the authorfunction was “a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse ...[by] grasping] the subject’s points of insertion, modes of functioning, and system of dependencies”. This is dependent upon, first, its creative use of anonymity, within pseudonymity, via the Group form (pseudonymity, one might say, is a condition of *historical* fictionalization); and second, the exploitation of the documentary, simultaneously, as indexical mark and pure cultural form. More deeply, it relies for its productive ambiguity upon a general ambiguity in the relationship between fictional and historical narratives themselves – an ambiguity that finds its point of indifference in the concept of *speculation*, through which it achieves both its philosophical and political force [...].

Fiction Nonetheless, the idea of the contemporary functions *as if* there is. That is, it functions as if the speculative horizon of the unity of human history had been reached. In this respect, the contemporary is a utopian idea, with both negative and positive aspects. Negatively, it involves a disavowal; positively, it is an act of the productive imagination. It involves a disavowal –a disavowal of its own futural, speculative basis– to the extent to which it projects an actual conjunction of times. This is a disavowal of the futurity of the present by its very presentness; essentially, it is a disavowal of politics. It is a productive act of imagination to the extent to which it performatively projects a non-existent unity onto the disjunctive relations between coeval times. In this respect, in rendering present the absent time of a unity of times, *all constructions of the contemporary are fictional.* Peter Osborne, “Contemporary art is post-conceptual art”, Antonio Ratti Fundazioan emandako hitzaldia. (Como: Villa Sucota, 2010), 13-14. Liburu honetan argitaratua: Peter Osborne, *Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art* (Londres eta New York: Verso, 2013).

Protagonistekiko argazki sekuentzialitate honen narratibak tragedia klasikoaren hausnarkotasunera garamatza⁵, non aktoreek ahots “objektiboz” hausnartzen duten amaiera eta ikusleekin zuzenean hitz egiten duten, komediaren kontakizunaren jarraipena eta antzezitutako eszenaren etena plano Errealekin apurtuaz, fikziozko jokoa areagotzen dute eta narratiba, subjektibitatea, irudikapena eta errealtatearen arteko etena ere bai, eta diskurtsoaren balizko jarraipenaren (ikuslera joan direnekin) eta errealek honek dramaren zati etena denez gero duen tentsioarekin dagoen flexioa erabiltzen dute, irudikapenaren ezkutuan dagoena agerian uzten dute Zentzu (ez)osoaren eten [konfiguratzaila] nabarmentzeko.⁶

[Lab., 421-422. or.]

5: Bi dimentsioetan, unitatearenean eta elementuenean, tragediaren esperientzia artistikoak produktu ederraren objektibitatearen atzera garamatza. Tragediak oroitzen estetikoa lantzen du eta objektibitate horren atzean dagoena argitaratzen du. Hori da tragediaren esperientzia estetikokoaren ezaugarria –tragediaren hausnarkotasunaren esperientzia legez–. Esperientzia estetikoa-hausnarkor honetan izaera performatiboaren (ekoizpenarena) esperientzia eta diferentziarena (aniztasunarena eta diferentzialitatearena) lotzen dira –bi dimentsioetan lotu ere, hau da, unitatearenean eta elementuenean–. Horrela, tragediaren unitatea “egindako” unitate bezala bizitzearen esperientzia unitate hau ahots anitzez osatuta egotearen esperientzia da eta ezin da horren atzera joan. [...] Kierkegaarden terminologia erabiltzen jarraitzen badugu, tragedia fenomeno etikoa dela esan dezakegu tragikoaren esperientziagatik eta fenomeno estetiko jokoarenagatik. Hemen “tragikoak” gatazkek etikoki esperimendututako konpoezintasuna izendatzen du eta “jokoak” (Derrida) berriro ere zentzua libre proiektatu eta disolbatzeko ekintza estetikoak. Christoph Menke, *Estética y Negatividad* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2001), 197.

6: Dramak taularatzten eta irudikatzen duen Zentzuaren osogabetasunari [godeliarr] eta honek Adornoren dialektika negatiboarekin eta eten konfiguratioarekin duen harremanari dagokionez, Althusserrek –*distantziamentu*– terminoa sartu zuen (Bertolt Brecht-ren obrari buruzko azterketa kritikoan), kontzientzia dramatiko/ideologikoaren eta errealtatearen arteko dialektika aztertuz, eta Hegelen ikuspegi fenomenologikoa desaktibatuz teatro materialistaren kontzepzio marxistatik, zeinak ikuslearengandiko distantziamentu hori adierazten duen esplizituki irudikatuta ez dagoen egoera dramatiko batekiko, baizik eta bereizten duen kontzientziarekiko beste hura bezala, ez tragedian ezaugarria den aktoreen interpretazioko adierazpen subjektibotik, baizik eta ahots edo figura interpretatibo horren absentsian, Zentzua ezabatzean [eta fikzioa des- ezabatzean] (egilearen oharra):

“Kontua ez da filosofia berri bat edo antzerki berri bat egitea. Filosofiarren barruan praktika berri bat ezartzea da kontua, munduaren interpretazio bat izateari utz diezaion, hau da, mistifikazioa, eta mundua eraldatzen lagundu dezan; antzerkiaren barneko praktika berri bat da, mistifikazioa izateari utz diezaion, hau da, dibertimendu kulinariora eta horrela mundua eraldatzen lagundu dezan. Praktika berriaren lehenengo efektua, beraz, filosofiarren eta antzerkiaren mistifikazioa suntsitzean oinarritu behar da. Ez dira filosofia eta antzerkia suntsitu behar, baizik eta horien mistifikazioa. Horrela, bada, beharrezkoa da gauzei euren izenaz deitzea, filosofiarri bere izenaz deitzea, antzerkiari bere izenaz deitzea, filosofia berriro ere bere egiazko tokian kokatzea, mistifikazio honi mistifikazioaren antza eman ahal izateko, eta aldi berean, filosofiarren eta antzerkiaren egiazko funtzioa erakusteko. Hau guztia filosofian eta antzerkian egin behar da, jakina. Filosofia eta antzerkia egiazko tokian jartzeko, beharrezkoa da *desplazamentu* bat (*déplacement*) egitea edo *desdóitze* (*décalage*) efektua egotea.

Hor ere gauzak antzera gertatzen dira Brecht eta Marxengan. Zentzu honetan ulertu daiteke Brechtek *Verfremdungseffekt* deitzen duena, hau da, distantziamentu efektua esan zaiona, nik batez ere *desplazamentu* efektu edo *desdóitze* efektu esan izan diodana. Efektu hau ez da hartu behar soilik antzerkiko teknikien efektu bezala, baizik eta antzerki praktikaren efektu orokor bezala. Kontua ez da desplazatzea, aktoreen interpretazioko (“jokoa”) elementu txiki batzuk desplazatzea, antzerkiko baldintza multzoari erasaten diona desplazatzea da kontua. Arau honek filosofiarako ere balio du. *Desplazamentu* multzo batek eratzen du, beraz, praktika berri hau. Desplazamentu hauetan gutxienez bada bat funtsezkoa, gainerako guztien kausa eta aldi berean laburpena: *ikuspuntuen desplazamentua*. Marx eta Brechten irakasgai handiena da ikuspegi orokorra desplazatu behar dela, filosofia eta antzerkiko gai guztien abiapuntu dena desplazatu behar dela. Munduaren interpretazio espekulatiboaren ikuspegi (filosofia) edo estetika kulinarioraren epaia (antzerkia) alde batera utzi eta desplazatu egin behar da, beste toki bat hartzeko, politikaren toki hau hartzeko, zentzumen indartsua.

[...] beharrezkoa da *antzerkia desplazatzea* ikusleen buruan dagoen *antzerkia ideologiarrekiko*. Honetarako, antzerkia antzerki dela “erakutsi” behar da, antzerkia besterik ez, ez dela bizitza. Eszena eszena bat dela erakutsi behar da, ikusleen aurrean jarritakoa eta ez aretoaren luzapen bat. Aretoaren eta eszenaren artean hutsune bat dagoela erakutsi behar da, distantzia bat. Distantzia hori *eszenan bertan erakutsi behar da*.”

Louis Althusser, *Sobre Brecht y Marx* (Mexico DF: Siglo XXI Editores, 1968), 5-6.

10. urratza Eten artistikoa. Bitartea Sentzuan eta indarberrialdia.

I have this conception of art, which is that art has to do with universality and infinity. It introduces something into the continuity of being, into the continuity of our survival. A break. Which is a universal break. [...] it breaks with the conditions of its own production.

[...] I don't think there's a rule. There is the capacity, well, the break-making capacity.

The way that we relate to ourselves is always conditioned by a break, there is a question of redoubling. Culture is always a question of redoubling: it redoubles the "normal" life. It reflects it into something else, but redoubling is always already there.⁷

Mladen Dolar



- Objektu irudikatzaile/dokumental baten (liburua, diskoa, irudia, artxiboa) hartze esperientzia banakoa [soziala] eta [kon]figuratzailea izateko, aipaturiko objektua ez den beste esperientzia bati –orainaldikoari- [Øpen present] lotuta joan behar du berariaz, hura eten edo tartekatu dezan.

[Lab., 702. or.]

Alderdi tekniko, politiko, instituzional, soziologiko, informazional... guztiak gailu bezala aurkeztzen dira agiriaren edo narratibaren funtzionalitate mugaturik gabe, erreferentzialitatean zintzilika geratzen ez den proiektu baten berehalako islarik gabe. Lanak (ikerketak artistikoak eta bere esperientzia estetiko esperimentalak) ez du formarik, baizik eta PROFORMA du, proiektu artistikoa egiteko estrategiaren antolakuntza bat da, eta hor elkarren ondoan ezartzen dira denborak eta moduak..., (heterotopikoak eta heterokronikoak), nahiak, kausalitateak eta kasualitateak (topaketak /kontingentzia). Ibon Aranberriren hitzei jarraituz: "*Informazio bihurtzean* [–bere dentsitate guztiarekin–], *eta parametro prelinguistikoetatik lantzean, Atlas bere antolakuntzan forman eraikitzen da*"⁸. Liburuaren edo edozein argitalpenen ohiko ideia horren kontra, hasiera eta amaiera duen ideia horren kontra, antolakuntza irekiagoa planteatzen da, hiru dimentsioko dokumentua espazioa maketatze (azalera forma bezala), ez da testu esplizitua, baizik eta arteari buruzko ideia ontologikoa, bere mugei buruz. Obra ez da estatizatzen bilduman, ez da itxita geratzen, baizik eta hemen planteamendu ireki bezala azaltzen da. Bildumaren barruko lehenengo aurkezpenak beste formulazio batzuetan egin dezake aurrera... beste norabide batzuetan.

There is a relationship between the conceptual "degree zero" of the essay-about-its-own-status-as-an-art-object-as-an-artobject and the juggernaut of total artistic liberty. [...] For Dan Graham, as for the others, there was never any question of being a writer. What artist wrote was not literature, not even art criticism; somehow it was art, or at least it had an internal and maybe a historically new relation to art. Graham and his fellow conceptual artists understood that a text could be an art object only under certain very specific conditions, conditions he helped to define with early pieces like *Schema* (March 1966). The first condition was that the text refer exclusively to its own status as both text and as proposal for an art object.⁹

Art documentation thus signals the attempt to use artistic media within art spaces to make direct reference to life itself, in other words: to a form of pure activity or pure praxis, as it were; indeed, a reference to life in the art project, yet without wishing to directly represent it. Here, art is transformed into a way of life, whereby the work of art is turned into non-art, to mere documentation of this of life. Or, put in different terms, art is now becoming biopolitical because it has begun to produce and document life itself as pure activity by artistic means.¹⁰

[Lab., 740. or.]

7: Mladen Dolar, Conny Habbel & Marlene Haderer egindako elkarrizketa 2010ean, "Wie geht Kunst?" webgunean argitaratua: <http://www.wiegehtkunst.com>

8: Ibon Aranberri, <http://www.macba.cat/es/rwm-fons-ibon-aranberri>

9: Jeff Wall, "Introduction", *Partially Reflective Mirror Writing. / Two Way Mirror Power*, Dan Graham (Massachusetts: The MIT Press Cambridge, 1999), 10-13.

10: Boris Groys, "The Loneliness of the Project", Issue II. Museum van Hedendaagse Kunst Antwerpen, Belgium (New York: Magazine of Contemporary Art and Theory, 2009), 5.

Ikerketa artistikoaren proiektuko zati da ikuslea eta bertan sartzen da bere garapen bideak erabiliaz (ikerketaren proiektu dokumental eta esperimentalaren hedapen aktibo eta etena), baina kontuan izanda bere oinarritzko kopresentzialitate konektiboa duela Erreala artikulatzen duen ororekin, ez soilik bere eraikuntza konfiguratiboa baizik eta bere existentzia korpuskularrena [partikular eta unibertsalarena].

Zeinu dokumentalak erabiltzen dituzten kasu eta eredu artistiko guztietatik/kontzeptutik post-kontzeptura ibilbide bat eginaz: postmodernismoko zitazio artistikotik eta sinboloaren eta esanahiaren serializaziotik, edo lengoaiaren literazioa bikoitz sinboliko legez –Lawrence Weiner– y zeinu bisual legez –Art & Language–, (edo beste batzuk, esaterako, Mel Bochner, Hanne Darboven, Marcel Broodthaers, Matt Mullican, Lothar Baumgarten, etab.) Logosa material esanguratsu (ez-esanahi) bezala erabiltzera, bere transferentzia semiotikotik eta itzulpen semantikotik ekoizpeneko artikulazio material izaerara igarotzen da (*post*-ekoizpeneko –kasu honetan -*post* bitakora hipermedia eta bere ekoizpen immaterialerako sarrera legez– iturri legez aktibatu aurretik), *readysing* bezala aurkeztzen da, berariazko zeinu minimalizatu eta nominalista readymade bailitzan, historizismoaren eraikuntza gramatologikoaren ebaki formal bezala aritzen da, edukiak adierazmolde zuzen, objektual batean kon-tsignatuaz, historizitatearen proiektu berri baten eten konfiguratzailerak apurtuko duen konposizio-artikulazio esperientzial baten bolumen proforma izateko; proiektu berri horretan objektu-agiriaren performatibitateak mugimendu “*post-estruturalista*” sail bat hasiko du iraganaren erretorika arkeologikotik gabe¹¹, baizik eta bere aukera prospektiboa araketa eta ikerketa artistiko-esperimental legez beste seinalektika bat eraikitzeko non formulazio linguistikoa, bere gertaeren, erakundearen edo esanahiaren fenomeno sinbolikoen fenomenologia transzendituaz egoera post-dispositibora igaro dadin eta hor adierazi dadin produktuaren eten ontiko-ontologikoa eta modu aktiboan [eta pasiboan] errealtatean idazten den liburu (proiektu) baten kapitulu gisa irudikatu./

[Lab., 751. or.]

11: Historizismoaren eta historizitatearen arteko lehenengo aldeak da, lehenengoak atzera begiratzen duenean horri buruz ditugun kliseak eta estereotipoak elkartu egiten dira irudikapen fiktizio batean eta horren forma nagusia pastichea da; bigarrenak, aldiz, historia modu aktiboan esperimentatzeko aukera berekin du, gure taldeko etorkizuna berbideratzeko. Peio Aguirre, *Archaeologies of the Future* (Bilbao: Sala Rekalde Erakustaretan, 2007), 25.

Oharra:

Aldiz, irudikapenean eten erreala eta ez artifizialak –ikerketa honetan planteatzen duguna eten artistikoarekin– irudikapenaren¹² [eta *ez-irudikapenaren*] gailuak geldiarazi behar ditu –naturalak (korporalak eta kognitiboak), diskurtsiboak eta interpretatiboak, teknikoak eta teknologikoak–. Erabateko etena (ez soilik disrupzioa edo inbertsioa, ezta erabateko krisian jartzea ere) tresna eta facto antropologikoetan [logiko eta ilogikoak –antropozentrikoak–]; errealtatearen isla den gure irudia neutrala izan dadin (ez potentzialki presubjektiboa –nahiari lotua eta hori proiektatzen duena–, baizik eta gizonaren irudi transzendental ez deliberatiboa¹³ [ezta desideratiboa ere] eta Ez-zentzukoaren aurrean duen islan esanahirik gabe, bere errealtate *ekstasikoa*¹⁴) orduan irudi kognitibo horren ko-errealtatea eman ahal izango da –bere baitan– (subjektu ikuslearen bat-bateko esterioritatean) Errealarekin bere baitan, eta horrela, *ondoren*, ko-agentzia baterako aukera egongo da: Zentzuarena –bere atzerapen infinitura tolestua eta ekoizpen sinbolikoko entitate immaterialera ere bai– kanpoko Ez-zentzuarekin –absolutua, esanezina– azkeneko hau gizonak ideatutakoa eta bere bitartekoen bidez manipulatutakoa ez delako.

[Lab., 980. or.]

Iñigo Cabo

* Hemendik ateratako zatiak: La DISCONTINUIDAD ARTÍSTICA Y EL SENSIMIENTO. De la discontinuidad configurativa del objeto arte en la producción de Sentido, al corte y co-agencia del Sinsentido en el Proyecto Artístico. (IC)

12: A model of representation cannot be at once a representation of the world and what establishes the possibility of that representation. It cannot represent the world and represent that representation. [...] the brain constitutes the physical world without it being possible to explain either how the brain comes to be part of the world, or indeed even how the world could have originally produced the brain. Ray Brassier, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 25.

13: Banako prozesu kognitiboei dagokiena, “banakoek bat-bateko inferentziak egiten dituztenean, prozesu kognitibo automatikoak konfiguratuaz, zeinetan ez dagoen deliberazioaren ahaleginik”. Angel Gómez, Elena Gaviria eta Itziar Fernández, *Psicología Social* (Madrid: Sanz y Torres, 2006), 32.

14: *Ecstasy* (or *ekstasis*; from the Ancient Greek ἔκστασις, “to be or stand outside oneself, a removal to elsewhere” from ek- “out,” and *stasis* “a stand, or a standoff of forces”) is a term used in Ancient Greek, Christian and Existential philosophy. The different traditions using the concept have radically different perspectives. The term is currently used in philosophy usually to mean “outside-of-itself”. One’s consciousness, for example, is not self-enclosed, one can be conscious of an Other person, who falls well outside of one’s own self. In a sense, consciousness is usually, “outside of itself,” in that its object (what it thinks about, or perceives) is not itself. This is in contrast to the term *enstasis* which means from “standing-within-onself” which relates to contemplation from the perspective of a speculator. J. Glenn Friesen, *Enstasy, Ecstasy and Religious Self-Reflection: A history of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas of pre-theoretical experience*. <http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Enstasy.pdf>





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[Cuts.]

[...] this artificial form represents in itself the discontinuity of the Sense, the logic of a Sense which, already discontinuous in itself –since through its inherent breaks, the no-sense and the composition referential to the absent to which the breaks allude [or elude] through their configurative discontinuities, are enunciated–, is limited in the letter –in the sign– as a leap, it is to say, in the figure which represents its cut:

If absence does not allow itself to be reduced by the letter, this is so because it is the letter's ether and respiration. The letter is the separation and limit in which meaning is liberated from its imprisonment in aphoristic solitude. For all writing is aphoristic. No "logic", no proliferation of conjunctive undergrowth can reach the end of its essential discontinuity and noncontemporaneity, the ingenuity of its *understood* silences. [...]

The rationality of the Logos, for which our writing is responsible, obeys the principle of discontinuity. The caesura does not simply finish and fix meaning: "The aphorism, the sentence —says Nietzsche— in which I, as the first among the Germans, am a master, are the forms of eternity". But, primarily, the caesura makes meaning emerge. It does not do so alone, of course; but without interruption —between letters, words, sentences, books— no signification could be awakened. *Assuming* that the Nature refuses the *leap*, one can understand why Scripture will never be Nature. It proceeds by leaps alone.¹

There will therefore be no theory of signs separate and differing from an analysis of meaning. Yet the system does grant a certain privilege to the former over the latter, since it does not accord that which is signified a nature different from that accorded to the sign, meaning cannot be anything more than the totality of the signs arranged in their progression, it will be given in the complete table of signs. But, on the other hand, the complete network of signs is linked together and articulated according to patterns proper to meaning.²

The evidence in image-sign, which [] positions in a characteristic way in the format-object of the language, –the book–, places before the reader both the configurative discontinuity of the aesthetic object –and of its linguistic acts, whether grammatical or visual–, and the general discontinuity of the Nature and its course, a rhythm before which the discontinuity between the Logos and the absence is precisely located, the space of the [aesthetic] negativity of the Sense, co-presenting it to the natural discontinuity which the signs only relate. What is set out in this catalogue is the necessity of a break of a reading experience, a cut in the visual sign which would act as an indication to the reader that what is developed through the infinite representation achieves its real Sense only in the proper break which the spectator implements after his/her his/her glance. The evidence of the image makes reference to the real [image], the affirmation

of the act of representation as a form does not try to contradict its configurative discontinuity, but specifically, to activate it as a sign, like the artificial reality whose experience is cultural, but whose presence and Sense are feasible only if another co-presence –to which not even the Sense arrives after its inherent cuts of no-sense, but recites– is activated, the undecidable co-presence of the natural and the Nonsense.

This presentation explicitly sets out to the reader the evident discontinuity of the images (it is presented to the Representation through its representation...), places at their disposal the principal discontinuity which is of our concern here. How does the artist act, apart from confirming the configurative discontinuities of a sign, when manifesting the discontinuity of his/her artistic act with regard to the discontinuity of the Real?, how does he/she develop his/her object so that it does not act in configurative discontinuity, representing what it had been already representing in other ways, but so that it is a real discontinuity? The object, in some way, not only has to demonstrate its [symbolic] leap, but achieve itself in the natural leap from the Real. The principal discontinuity, therefore, is that which orders the break in the very artistic act of discontinuous configuration, the artistic discontinuity which *un*-voluntarily produces a break in the production of the Sense in order to clear up the configurative discontinuities of the Representation, above all, as far as the revolution [movement] and transference of this representation are concerned, where the configurative discontinuities pronounce themselves exponentially and revert in the duplicated language [parallax] what they observed directly before. The break of the artistic discontinuity is precisely relevant where the formats generate and transmit a reflexive multiplicity which delves in the infinite negativity of the Sense, and where they force it to be a *difference(ial)* sign.

[Extract, Pages 693-694]

- 1- **Symbolic level:** visual reading of images and the subjective-imaginary interpretation of the text (aesthetic negativity). Absence. Configurative discontinuity.
- 2- **Perceptive level:** Cognitive, audio-visual perception, manual contact, capture through senses. Touch.
- 3- **Super-linguistic, object-form level:** phonic physicality of the text, graphic appearance, iconic appearance. Presence.

[Extract, Page 699]

The three different levels, which range from the reading and apprehensive interpretation, through touch and physical, sensory and perceptive contact, until arriving to a situation of co-presence between the super-subjective and pre-subjective reality (forces), the evidence of representation as (formal, material and pre-linguistic) reality, and the interactive interweaving with the phenomena of natural physics, position in the break between

1: Jacques Derrida, *La escritura y la diferencia* (Barcelona: Editorial Anthropos, 1989), 98.

2: Michelle Foucault, *Las palabras y las cosas: una arqueología de las ciencias humanas* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno editores, 2010), 72.

the co-presence of the subjective order and the systems, media and bodies of the objective, the co-presence of the ontic and the ontological. The Nonsense and the Sense manifest themselves as joint appearances in the Real, a vehicle of the representation without supremacies, both a neutralization (of the configurative discontinuities and their reception, or the hierarchies between discourse and narration, between a document and fiction, between signs, information and symbols), and different intensities between objects, devices, media, forms and the effusiveness of the personal, experiential, vital, private, collective, social and public.

[Extract, Page 713]

[...] Certainly, the art can very well be the space where an image represents not even one thing –pure– nor a power which due to this limitation of representation has been qualified to swoop down over individuals. There is an *unpower* in the art which, paradoxically, can be the model way of emancipation, an *unpower* which counters the existing power, which lives from a *separate* representationality.³

[...] the fictionalization of artistic authority or what, adapting Foucault, we may call “the artist-function”, and the fictionalization of the documentary form, in particular, the archive. Such fictionalization corresponds to and renders visible the fictitiousness of the contemporary itself.⁴

3: Carlos Vidal, *Crítica de la representaciones*. Para una redefinición del concepto de representación. En *tiempo Real*. El arte mientras tiene lugar (La Coruña: Fundación Luis Seoane, 2001), 78.

4: In his essay on post-conceptualism, Peter Osborne analyzes the fictional aspect of the work of *The Atlas Group* in the following way: **The fictionalization of artistic authority (anonymity and the author-function)**. The fictionalization of artistic authority or what, adapting Foucault, we may call “the artist-function”, and the fictionalization of the documentary form, in particular, the archive. Such fictionalization corresponds to and renders visible the fictitiousness of the contemporary itself. It also renders explicit a certain general fictitiousness of the post-conceptual artwork, which is an effect of the counter-factuality inherent in its conceptual dimension, and imparts to it a structurally “literary” aspect. Each materialization can be understood as the performance of a fictive element or idea. In this respect, the generic post-medium concept of art reincorporates “literature”, returning it to its philosophical origins in early German romanticism. *Post-conceptual art articulates a post-aesthetic poetics*. Historically, the fictionalization of the artist-function is, of course, not an uncommon authorial strategy. It represents an extension of both the strategy of pseudonymity (prevalent under conditions of censorship and the need for social dissimulation of various kinds) and the “impersonality” of an Eliottian modernism. Theoretically, it is best conceived, I think, in terms of Foucault’s analysis of the author-function, which was itself in many ways (like much of post-structuralism) a theorization of the implications of the practice of the modernist avant-gardes. For Foucault, the replacement of the concept of the author by that of the authorfunction was “a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse ...[by] grasping] the subject’s points of insertion, modes of functioning, and system of dependencies”. This is dependent upon, first, its creative use of anonymity, within pseudonymity, via the Group form (pseudonymity, one might say, is a condition of *historical* fictionalization); and second, the exploitation of the documentary, simultaneously, as indexical mark and pure cultural form. More deeply, it relies for its productive ambiguity upon a general ambiguity in the relationship between fictional and historical narratives themselves – an ambiguity that finds its point of indifference in the concept of *speculation*, through which it achieves both its philosophical and political force [...].

Fiction Nonetheless, the idea of the contemporary functions *as if* there is. That is, it functions as if the speculative horizon of the unity of human history had been reached. In this respect, the contemporary is a utopian idea, with both negative and positive aspects. Negatively, it involves a disavowal; positively, it is an act of the productive imagination. It involves a disavowal –a disavowal of its own futurality, speculative basis– to the extent to which it projects an actual conjunction of times. This is a disavowal of the futurity of the present by its very presentness; essentially, it is a disavowal of politics. It is a productive act of imagination to the extent to which it performatively projects a non-existent unity onto the disjunctive relations between coeval times. In this respect, in rendering present the absent time of a unity of times, *all constructions of the contemporary are fictional*. Peter Osborne, “Contemporary art is post-conceptual art”, Lecture given at Fondazione Antonio Ratti. (Como: Villa Surota, 2010), 13-14. Published in: Peter Osborne, *Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art* (London and New York: Verso, 2013).

This narrative of photographic sequentiality with characters brings us the reflexivity of the classical tragedy⁵, where the actors reflect on the dénouement in an “objective” voice and talk directly to the audience, breaking the continuity of the story, a characteristic of the comedy, and the discontinuity of the scene represented with the Real plan, amplifying the game of the fiction and that of the proper discontinuity between the narrative, subjectivity, representation and reality, using the flexion between the alleged continuity of the discourse in a real sense (with the audience observing) and the tension of this real as a discontinuous part of the drama, revealing what is concealed in the representation, in order to emphasize the evidence of the [configurative] discontinuity to the *(in)*complete Sense.⁶

[Extract, Pages 421-422]

5 In both dimensions, that of unity and that of elements, the aesthetic experience of the tragedy again leads us after the objectivity of a beautiful product. The tragedy does the aesthetic work of remembrance and discovers what lies beneath in a form that is concealed from this objectivity. This characterizes the aesthetic experience of the tragedy as a reflexive experience – as an experience of reflexivity of the tragedy. This aesthetic-reflexive experience intertwines –again in both directions, it is to say, that of a unity and that of elements– the experience of the performative character (of the production) with that of the difference (of the diversity and differentiality). In this way, the experience of the unity of the tragedy as a “made” unity is at the same time the act of experiencing that this unity is made of a variety of voices, after which it is impossible to go back. [...] if we go on using the Kierkegaardian terminology, we will then be able to say that the tragedy is an ethical phenomenon due to the experience of the tragedy, and an aesthetic phenomenon, due to that of a game. “The tragic” here means the ethically experimented irresolvability of conflicts, and the “game” (Derrida), the aesthetic development of a free act of projecting and again dissolving the sense. Christoph Menke, *Estética y Negatividad* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2001), 197.

6 As far as the [Gödelian] incompleteness of the Sense, which puts on a scene and represents the drama and its relation with the negative dialectic of the Decor and with the configurative discontinuity, Althusser introduces the term “distancing” (in his critical analysis of the works of Bertolt Brecht), revising the dialectic between the dramatic / ideological conscience and the reality, and deactivating the phenomenological perspective of Hegel from the Marxist concept of materialistic theater which expresses this distancing of the spectator from a dramatic situation not represented explicitly, as that other thing which is different than the conscience which makes it different, not by its subjective expression in the actor’s interpretation, characteristic of the tragedy, but by the absence of the voice or interpretation figure, in the veil of the Sense [and in the unveiling of the fiction] (Author’s note):

“It is not about producing a new philosophy or a new theatre. It is about establishing a new practice in philosophy’s interior, so that it ceases to be an interpretation of the world, it is to say, a mystification, and helps in the transformation of the world; it is about a new practice in the theater’s inside, so that it ceases to be a mystification, it is to say, a culinary entertainment, and helps in the transformation of the world. Therefore, the first effect of the new practice ought to be based on the destruction of philosophy and theater’s mystification. Not deleting philosophy and the theater, but deleting their mystification. So it is necessary to call the things by their name, call philosophy by its name, call the theater by its name, put philosophy back in its real place, to make this mystification appear as mystification and, at the same time, to show philosophy and theater’s real function. All that should naturally be done in philosophy and in the theater. In order to put philosophy and the theater in their real place, it is necessary to make a *displacement* (*déplacement*), or the *deadjustment* (*décalage*) effect.

There are similar things taking place at Brecht’s and Marx’s, too. It is in this sense that one can understand what Brecht calls the *Verfremdungseffekt*, that is, what has been translated into Spanish as the distancing effect, which I translate as *displacement* effect or *deadjustment* effect. This effect should not be understood only as a theater techniques’ effect, but as a general effect of the theater practice. It is not about changing the place, of moving some small elements in the actors’ interpretation (“game”), it is about moving what affects the set of the theater conditions. The same principle is valid for philosophy. So, it is about a *set of displacements* which constitute this new practice. Among all these displacements, there is a fundamental one, which is the cause of all the others and at the same time, their summary: *the displacement of the point of view*. The great lesson of Marx and Brecht is that the general point of view, the starting point for the consideration of all the philosophy and theater issues, should be displaced. One should abandon the point of view of the speculative interpretation of the world (philosophy) or the judgment of culinary aesthetics (the theater) and displace oneself to occupy another place which is, it is the strong sense, that of politics.

[...] it is necessary to *displace the theater in relation to the ideology of the theater* which exists in the audience’s heads. For this, it should be “shown” that the theater is the theater, only theater, and not life. It should be shown that the scene is a scene, erected in front of the audience, and not the prolongation of the room. It should be shown that between the room and the scene, there is emptiness, a distance. This distance should be shown on the *scene itself*.”

Louis Althusser, *Sobre Brecht y Marx* (Mexico DF: Siglo XXI Editores, 1968), 5-6.

Step 10. Artistic discontinuity. Break between the Sense and the reactivation.

I have this conception of art, which is that art has to do with universality and infinity. It introduces something into the continuity of being, into the continuity of our survival. A break. Which is a universal break. [...] it breaks with the conditions of its own production.

[...] I don't think there's a rule. There is the capacity, well, the break-making capacity.

The way that we relate to ourselves is always conditioned by a break, there is a question of redoubling. Culture is always a question of redoubling: it redoubles the "normal" life. It reflects it into something else, but redoubling is always already there.⁷

Mladen Dolar



- A representational / documentary object (book, disc, image, archive) whose receptive experience, both individual [social] and [con]figurative, has to be expressly linked to another experience –of the present– [Øpen present] different from that of the object referred to, which will cut or make a break in the latter.

[Extract, Page 702]

All the technical, political, institutional, sociological, informational... aspects are presented as a device without the limited functionality of a document or a story, without the immediate reflection in a project which is not supported in the referentiality. The work (the artistic investigation and its experimental, aesthetic experience) does not have a form, but a PROFORM, it is an organization of the strategy of making an artistic project, in which times and modes..., (heterotopic and heterochronic), intentionalities, causalities and casualities (encounters /contingency) juxtapose. Following Ibon Aranberri's words: "*In translating it into an information [–with all its density–], and developing it, parting from pre-linguistic parameters, the Atlas is constructed in the very form of organization*"⁸. Against the conventional idea of a book or a publication with a beginning and an end, there is a proposal of an organization which is more open: a three-dimensional document which would suppose laying out the space (as a form of surface); it is not an explicit text, but an ontological idea of the art, concerning its own limit. A work in a collection does not become static, does not stay closed, but it is shown here as an open proposal. This first presentation as part of a collection can move forward into other forms... in other directions.

There is a relationship between the conceptual "degree zero" of the essay-about-its-own-status-as-an-art-object-as-an-artobject and the juggernaut of total artistic liberty. [...] For Dan Graham, as for the others, there was never any question of being a writer. What artist wrote was not literature, not even art criticism; somehow it was art, or at least it had an internal and maybe a historically new relation to art. Graham and his fellow conceptual artists understood that a text could be an art object only under certain very specific conditions, conditions he helped to define with early pieces like *Schema* (March 1966). The first condition was that the text refer exclusively to its own status as both text and as proposal for an art object.⁹

Art documentation thus signals the attempt to use artistic media within art spaces to make direct reference to life itself, in other words: to a form of pure activity or pure praxis, as it were; indeed, a reference to life in the art project, yet without wishing to directly represent it. Here, art is transformed into a way of life, whereby the work of art is turned into non-art, to mere documentation of this of life. Or, put in different terms, art is now becoming biopolitical because it has begun to produce and document life itself as pure activity by artistic means.¹⁰

[Extract, Page 740]

7: Mladen Dolar, interview made by Conny Habbel & Marlene Haderer in 2010, published in the "Wie geht Kunst?" website: <http://www.wiegehtkunst.com>

8: Ibon Aranberri, <http://www.macba.cat/es/rwm-fons-ibon-aranberri>

9: Jeff Wall, "Introduction", *Partially Reflective Mirror Writing. / Two Way Mirror Power*, Dan Graham (Massachusetts: The MIT Press Cambridge, 1999), 10-13.

10: Boris Groys, "The Loneliness of the Project", Issue II. Museum van Hedendaagse Kunst Antwerpen, Belgium (New York: Magazine of Contemporary Art and Theory, 2009), 5.

The spectator forms part of the artistic investigation project and enters in it, generating his/her own development channels (the active and discontinuous extension of the documentary and experimental project of the investigation), but taking into account his/her elementary and connective co-presence with all that which enunciates the Real, not only his/her configurative construction, but the experience of his/her corpuscular [particular and universal] existence.

Among all the cases and artistic models which re-use the documentary signs / drawing a trajectory from the concept to the post-concept: from the artistic citation of postmodernism and the serialization of the symbol and meaning, or the letterization of the language as symbolic double –Lawrence Weiner– and visual sign –Art & Language–, (or others, like Mel Bochner, Hanne Darboven, Marcel Broodthaers, Matt Mullican, Lothar Baumgarten, etc.), to the use of the Logos as a meaningful material (no-meaning) which moves from its semiotic transference and semantic translation to its state of a material object of production (before its activation as the source of *post*-production –in this case, the *-post* as “a post” in the hypermedia log book and its immaterial production), presenting itself as a *readysign*: a specific, minimized sign and nominalist as readymade, which acts as a formal break in the grammato-logic construction of historicism, con-signing the contents in a direct, objectual expression, so that they serve as proformal volumes to an experiential composition-articulation, which breaks with the configurative discontinuity of a new historicity, in which the performativity of the object-document would give outlet to a series of *post-structuralist* movements which do not have at their disposal a rhetoric archeology of the past¹¹, but a prospective possibility of inquiry and artistic-experimental investigation in the construction of other signaling system in which the linguistic formulation, transcending its phenomenology of events, institutions and symbolic phenomena, would drift into a post-dispositive situation in which the ontic-ontological discontinuity of the product and its representation as a chapter of a book (project) which is actively [and passively] written in the reality, will manifest. /

[Extract. Page 751]

11: Peio Aguirre, *Archaeologies of the Future* (Bilbao: Sala Rekalde Erakustaretoa, 2007), 25.

Side note:

On the contrary, the real and not artificial break in the representation –which we set out in this investigation with the artistic discontinuity– has to suspend the natural (corporeal and cognitive), discourse and interpretation, technical and technological devices of representation¹² [and the *non-representation*]. Complete cut (not only the disruption or inversion, nor putting into sovereign crisis) in the anthropological [logical and illogical –anthropocentric–]; so that our image reflecting the real can be neutral (not potentially presubjective –linked to the desire and projecting it–, but a transcendental, not deliberative¹³ [nor desiderative] of the man, and without meaning in his/her reflection before the Nonsense, in its *ekstasic*¹⁴ reality)– and therefore enabling the co-reality of this cognitive image –in itself– (in its immediate outside appearance to the observing subject) with the Real in itself, in this way allowing, *subsequently*, a co-agency: of the Sense –spread out to its infinite postponement, as well as to its reality of an non-material entity of symbolic origin– with the exterior –absolute, undecidable– Nonsense, as the latter is not invented by the man nor manipulated by his/her media.

[Extract. Page 980]

Iñigo Cabo

* Fragments taken from: *La DISCONTINUIDAD ARTÍSTICA Y EL SENSINSENTIDO*. De la discontinuidad configurativa del objeto arte en la producción de Sentido, al corte y co-agencia del Sinsentido en el Proyecto Artístico. (IC)

12: A model of representation cannot be at once a representation of the world and what establishes the possibility of that representation. It cannot represent the world and represent that representation. [...] the brain constitutes the physical world without it being possible to explain either how the brain comes to be part of the world, or indeed even how the world could have originally produced the brain.
Ray Brassier, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 25.

13: Corresponding to individual cognitive processes, “when the individuals develop spontaneous inferences, configuring automatic cognitive processes in which there is no deliberation effort.”
Angel Gómez, Elena Gaviria eta Itziar Fernández, *Psicología Social* (Madrid: Sanz y Torres, 2006), 32.

14: *Ecstasy* (or *ekstasis*; from the Ancient Greek ἔκστασις, “to be or stand outside oneself, a removal to elsewhere” from ek- “out,” and *stasis* “a stand, or a standoff of forces”) is a term used in Ancient Greek, Christian and Existential philosophy. The different traditions using the concept have radically different perspectives. The term is currently used in philosophy usually to mean “outside-of-itself”. One’s consciousness, for example, is not self-enclosed, one can be conscious of an Other person, who falls well outside of one’s own self. In a sense, consciousness is usually, “outside of itself,” in that its object (what it thinks about, or perceives) is not itself. This is in contrast to the term *enstasis* which means from “standing-within-onself” which relates to contemplation from the perspective of a speculator.
J. Glenn Friesen, *Ecstasy, Ecstasy and Religious Self-Reflection: A history of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas of pre-theoretical experience*. <http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Enstasy.pdf>



- ① «Vizir», cheval arabe de Napoléon 1er
Vers 1800 - 1825
- ② Tapis de selle d'apparat
Vers 1804 - 1815
- ③ Éperon de Napoléon 1er
Vers 1804 - 1815
- ④ Paire d'étriers de Napoléon 1er
Vers 1804 - 1815



